‘… Lansdale’s behind-the-scenes activity had maneuvered Philippine political, military, and establishment figures into doing the job themselves.’
AXE of Perun? The Hamper of Gwyddno Garanhir? The Bow of Karna (Vijaya dhanush)? The Shirt of Nessus? Or you prefer the AKM assault rifle toted by Osama bin Laden the night when the US Navy EALs killed him in a raid? Flight suits worn by pilots of Cold War-era U-2+A-12 spy planes and other declassified artifacts from the Agency? [https://malaya.com.ph/news_news/us-cias-in-house-museum-adds-new-spy-exhibits/]
In 1972, former CIA Executive Director William E. Colby had the idea for a museum with “a very selective accumulation of truly unique items,” which now includes spy gadgets, specialized weaponry, and espionage memorabilia. “Many of our artifacts were created for intelligence operations and cannot be found anywhere else.” [https://www.cia.gov/legacy/museum/]
How about the 21 March 1973 memo for the director of Central Intelligence regarding a Special National Intelligence Estimate on the Muslim Uprising in Southern Philippines requested by USAF Brigadier-General Brent Scowcroft? Or the Information Report of 18 April 1950 stating that Huk leaders Mariano Balgos and Guillermo Capadocia were in Singapore?
The National Intelligence Daily Cable of 25 August 1977 containing this item: “Philippines: Martial Law Relaxed. Marcos’ amnesty decree reaffirms earlier directives that applied only to low-level detainees who wish to return ‘voluntarily’ to the folds of law. By most official accounts, there are close to 4,000 detainees in the Philippines. Prominent political detainees, such as former senator Benigno Aquino — Marcos’ chief political rival before his imprisonment shortly after martial law was declared in 1972 — will not be affected by Marcos’ announcement.” [CIA-RDP79T00975A030300010026-6]
These artifacts confirm continuing American interest in Rizal’s native land.
(1) “The attacks on Hawaii and the Philippines, and the mishandling of the intelligence we then had, greatly influenced our government’s later decision on how our intelligence work should be organized. While the warnings received before the attack from deciphered Japanese cables may not have been clear enough to permit our leaders to pinpoint Hawaii and the Philippines, they should at least, if adequately analyzed, have alerted us to imminent danger in the Pacific.” [Allen W. Dulles. The Craft of Intelligence: America’s Legendary Spy Master on the Fundamentals of Intelligence Gathering for a Free World. NY: The New American Library of World Literature, Inc., 1963, p. 53]
(2) “The future Most Wanted list all-star first came to the attention of US intelligence about the time it was learned that his (Khalid Sheikh Mohammed) nephew, Ramzi Yousef, had been involved in planning the 1993 World Trade Center attack. Yousef was arrested in Islamabad, Pakistan, in 1995 and later tried and convicted in US courts for his part in planning ‘Operation Bojinka,’which envisioned simultaneously blowing up twelve airliners over the Pacific. Yousef had also been involved in plots to assassinate Pope John Paul II during an official visit to the Philippines and in a plan to have a suicide pilot fly a small plane loaded with explosives into CIA headquarters… During the mid-1990s, CIA chased KSM around three continents. We attempted to bring him to justice in Qatar, the Philippines, and even Brazil.” [George Tenet. At the Center of the Storm: My Years at the CIA. NY: HarperCollins Publishers Inc., 2007, pp. 250-251]
(3) “I first heard of General Lansdale, then an Air Force lieutenant colonel, in 1950 when he was seconded to CIA and posted to a senior OPC position in the Philippines. Using his cover as an advisor to the Philippine army, Lansdale helped the Philippine government put down the Huk guerrilla forces which had already brought significant areas of the country under their control. The Huk movement, a direct descendant of the Hukbalahap guerrillas who had fought the Japanese invaders, was under strong communist direction. Colonel Lansdale identified Ramon Magsaysay, a congressman, as a potential leader who with some guidance and support might be able to find a path between the established but corrupt right-wing politicians and the increasingly powerful left. With Lansdale’s help, Magsaysay became secretary of defense, and was able to launch a series of military moves and political initiatives, including an important land reform program, which by 1953 had tamed the Huk movement and contributed directly to Magsaysay’s eventual election as president. In Washington, President Eisenhower recognized Lansdale’s operation as a prime example of sophisticated political action. Not only had a guerrilla insurrection been put down, but Lansdale’s behind-the-scenes activity had maneuvered Philippine political, military, and establishment figures into doing the job themselves. A corrupt government had been turned into a working democracy. It was a tour de force. Just about everything worked right. Sometime after the Magsaysay election, Lansdale moved along to Vietnam. There things did not go as well.” [Richard Helms. Chapter 19: “An Agile Mammal.” A look over my shoulder: a life in the Central Intelligence Agency. NY: Random House, Inc., 2003]
Priceless? “None of the items, all of which are considered US government heritage assets, have been assessed for value.” [https://www.reuters.com/world/us/us-cias-in-house-museum-adds-new-spy-exhibits-2022-09-24/] And of America’s competitors in the game? ChiCom assets in Mindanao?
