‘The SC, in the exercise of its equally exclusive power of judicial review, may declare the entire rules of Congress or some of its provisions unconstitutional. But it has no power to prescribe the rules.’
IN life, we are sometimes faced with a dilemma—a difficult choice between doing the right thing and doing things the right way.
That seems to be the tone of the Supreme Court decision declaring the articles of impeachment against the Vice President unconstitutional on a matter of technicality.
The ponente made sure to point out that the ruling “does not absolve [the VP] from any of the charges (and) any ruling on the charges against her can only be accomplished through another impeachment process, followed by a trial and conviction by the Senate.”
I don’t know if it’s just a slip of the pen (or the keyboard), but am I wrong in interpreting that the sentence practically “convicted” the VP, or at the very least, told the Senate to convict her when a new impeachment is initiated, “not earlier than February 6, 2026”?
Note the phrase “followed by a trial and conviction by the Senate.” Should this not be “followed by trial and conviction or acquittal by the Senate,” as the case may be?
I may be splitting semantics. But since the decision was heavy on adhering to technicalities and procedures, due process and the right of the respondent to be heard (and by extension, although the SC did not point it out, the right to be presumed innocent until proven guilty), I thought the SC should have been also precise in its wording of the decision.
Well, I guess that’s just another “small” item for ex-justices and lawyers to argue about.
That’s on top of the questions on the Court’s appreciation (or misappreciation) of the timeline of events involving the House of Representatives’ action on the first three impeachment complaints and the fourth complaint that became the articles sent to the Senate.
My issue is with the Court’s “prescription” of compliance with due process. By listing such requisites, the Court practically encroached on the powers of Congress to formulate its rules on impeachment. The Constitution grants that power exclusively to the House and the Senate.
The SC, in the exercise of its equally exclusive power of judicial review, may declare the entire rules of Congress or some of its provisions unconstitutional. But it has no power to prescribe the rules.
But that is what the SC did on pages 4-5 of the decision.
Worse, the prescribed rules to comply with “due process” also contradict the Constitution—or, to quote the ponencia, the “principles of due process.”
What does the Constitution say about due process?
Section 1 of the Bill of Rights states: “No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws.”
I may be wrong, but I submit that this provision basically applies to judicial (criminal and civil) and, to a certain extent, administrative proceedings where an accused may be deprived of life, liberty or property.
But the SC, in several decisions, including this one, has always affirmed that impeachment is neither a criminal nor a civil nor an administrative process. It is a political process distinct and separate from judicial proceedings. A class of its own.
Thus, it is neither the power nor the duty of the Court—even in the exercise of judicial review—to enforce specific procedural requirements in impeachment, except those laid down in the Constitution.
That doesn’t mean, though, that it is not subject to certain rules of due process and equal protection of the law.
But certainly not in the absolute manner that the SC decision wants to impose (or has imposed).
To do so is too much of a stretch of legal imagination.
In impeachment, the only penalty is removal from office—which hardly counts as losing life, liberty or property. Unless the impeached (take note, not accused) official invokes that being removed from office is equivalent to losing life (because it is their only source of sustenance) or property (because it is their belief that the position they hold is their franchise).
But even if the rules of due process are applied, they are not absolute. The Constitution, no less, provides for exceptions even in criminal cases.
For example, the right to remain silent may not be waived except in writing and the presence of counsel. The right to bail is guaranteed except when the offense is punishable by life imprisonment and the evidence of guilt is strong. The right against double jeopardy does not apply when the person involved has not been previously arraigned for the same case.
So, while the first mode of initiating impeachment—where the complaint is not signed or endorsed by at least one-third of the members of the House—requires the entire gamut of due process, from referral to committee to giving the official involved the opportunity to be heard to public hearings, the second mode is the exception.
It is an exception contemplated in the same manner.
So once the complaint is signed by one-third of the House, the Constitution says it constitutes the articles of impeachment and once sent to the Senate, a trial shall begin. The entire gamut of due process no longer applies—only compliance with the number as the Constitution requires.
To be sure, the SC has the power to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to a lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the government.
But who stops the SC from committing grave abuse of discretion?
