‘Magellan was without vambrace. How else would he have been wounded in the sword arm with a bamboo spear?’
THE Permanent Mission of the Philippines to ASEAN helmed by Ambassador Noel Servigon wished to know more about the significance of the battle of Mactan in Philippine, Southeast Asian and world history. Our response: “The ‘virtu’ of the soldiers is worth more than a multitude, and the site is often of more benefit than ‘virtu’.” [Machiavelli’s Rules of War No. 12]
The same as Overview and Area of Operations? The war aims then of the principal adversaries are to subdue the intransigent datu (thereby displaying personal and cultural power) for Magellan and to defend integrity (territorial and personal) for Lapu-Lapu. As for weather and terrain, it was tropical summer and low-lying Pacific coral island of rock coasts with sandy beaches, lagoons and extensive mangrove swamps. In close proximity to the east of Humabon’s rajahnate, Mactan is within the Cebu Strait: three hours from the launching area and obstacles to troop landing: “The boats could not approach nearer because of certain rocks in the water.” [The Philippine Islands, 1493-1898, Volume XXXIII] There were clear fields of fire, but no cover and concealment for the assault team. Terrain was advantageous to the defenders; in fact, the projectiles shot by the musketeers and crossbowmen amounted to 30 minutes of useless firing because not only were the Mactanese out of range of the European ship cannons but they were also far and fast enough to evade the killing reach of the slow-loading matchlocks and crossbows. In addition, the defenders had intelligently prepared the battlefield because they “had dug certain pit holes between the houses in order that we might fall into them.” [Primo Viaggio Intorno Al Mondo by Antonio Pigafetta, ca. 1525, of events of 1519—1522. Translation by James Alexander Robertson]
The principal combat formation of the attackers was a pair of bands of Europeans (49 strong, nine nationalities) composed of sailors and common seamen led by two knights.
The support units were three boats, 11 aboard guarding all. Reserves were 20-30 balanghais of Humabon’s subjects commanded by some of the datus, the Prince of Cebu and the Rajah himself. The defenders were three divisions (1,500 Mactanons): two flanks assisting the dynamic center that faced the assault.
The key weapons system of the attackers was the pike-and-shot plus medieval swords for the officers. For the defenders, the freemen armed themselves with shield (kalasag), javelins and dagger (baladao) on their left hand and spear (bancao) on their right hand, with cutlass (campilan) tied to the waist hanging on the left. Supplemented by archers and sling men.
For protective gear, morions or armets for the helm, corslets for the trunk (breastplate and back piece), and bucklers or adargas or targets (round wood or metal shield, 2 ft wide, convex) to deflect direct body thrusts. [The conquistador, 1492-1550 by John Pohl, Adam Hook] The European sailor or common seaman may have also brought his brigandine (protective vest) or an ordinary shirt of mail (15-30 pounds of extra weight on the body).
Neither the Commander nor his ship-mates wore chausses because the Knight of Rhodes testified: “The natives shot only at our legs, for the latter were bare.” And worse: “They shot the captain through the right leg with a poisoned arrow.” Finally: “One of them wounded him on the left leg with a large cutlass…That caused the captain to fall face downward.”
Magellan was without vambrace. How else would he have been wounded in the sword arm with a bamboo spear? He could have been Iron Man down to his sabatons but armor radiates 200+ degrees Fahrenheit and tropical heat would have cooked him. He had two bad choices: full-coverage with his cuirass and faint or maneuverability with incomplete protection. Magellan chose the latter and it was fatal.
The defending Visayan was Pintado (tattooed with mystical symbols for spiritual as well as physical protection). His kalasag may be woven but it is designed to trap the opponent’s spear or frustrate the arrow: “The shots only passed through the shields which were made of thin wood.”
Verdict: the attacking side did not have true technological advantage. As to logistics, the musketeer may have brought enough pellets or balls but they “shot from a distance for about a half-hour, but uselessly.” The arquebus, although a favorite Spanish weapon, is vulnerable to water; developed to carry a slow match to the gun-powder, but the gunner was wading on the beach. Meanwhile, the defenders had ample ammo: “They shot so many arrows at us and hurled so many bamboo spears (some of them tipped with iron) at the captain-general, besides pointed stakes hardened with fire, stones, and mud, that we could scarcely defend ourselves.” Moreover, the natives, “picking up the same spear four or six times, hurled it at us again and again.”
C3 system, Magellan lacked firm Command (“The captain cried to them, ‘Cease firing! cease firing!’ but his order was not at all heeded.”), showed weak Control (“he ordered us to retire slowly, but the men took to flight”), and was fuzzy with Communications (Magellan was Portuguese, the common jargon of the ship-mates was nautical Spanish, and the nine European nationalities carried nine different accents). In contrast, the defenders all shouted in Cebuano-Malay, and Lapu-Lapu’s directives were relayed via mentors like Sagpang (Sampong) Baha of Pusok and headmen like Bali Alho of Maribago, Tindak-Bukid of Marigondon, Bugto Pasan, and Datu Umindig of Ibo/Agus, among others. [Heidi K. Gloria, “The Legend of Lapu-Lapu: An Interpretation,” Philippine Quarterly of Culture and Society, Vol. 1, No. 3 (September 1973), pp. 200-208] In terms of intelligence, Humabon should have fully briefed Magellan. In turn, Magellan’s coming was prophesied to Lapu-Lapu by Datu Manggal.
The Principle of Mass as a Principle of War. “What decides the outcome of wars and battles is usually not the amount of forces you have, but the amount of forces you have where it counts, where the battle is decided. In the case of Magellan, he failed to rally the forces of his allies and underestimated the force of Lapulapu.” [Philippine Navy Commander R. Abergas] Validated by Pigafetta: “The Christian king would have aided us, but the captain charged him before we landed, not to leave his balanghai, but to stay to see how we fought.”
Tactical outcome: Eight KIA on European side. Magellan plus Captain Christóbal Rabelo of the “Victoria,” Francisco Espinosa (sailor), Anton Gallego (common seaman), Juan de Torres (sobresaliente and soldier), Rodrigo Nieto (servant of Juan de Cartagena), Pedro Gomez (servant of Gonzalo Espinosa), and Anton de Escovar (sobresaliente). Four Humabon Cebuanos by friendly fire: “Christians and who had come afterward to aid us were killed by the mortars of the boats”). 15 KIA on the Mactan side. Strategic outcome: continuation of Philippine freedom. [https://jakartapm.dfa.gov.ph/sample-sites/640-permanent-mission-of-the-philippines-to-asean-conducts-a-webinar-on-the-battle-of-mactan]
