“POWER is when we have every justification to kill—and we don’t.”—Oskar Schindler, portrayed by Liam Neeson, Schindler’s List

To be sure, the contempt power—or the power to cite persons in contempt—is first and foremost judicial, not a legislative power.

It is a power granted to judges and justices that is, as the late US Supreme Court Chief Justice Taft said, “most and indispensable in protecting the due and orderly administration of justice and in maintaining the authority and dignity of the court.”

But while it is a paramount power, its exercise, US Chief Justice William Howard Taft (yes, the same Taft who served as governor-general of the Philippines and after whom a street is named) cautioned “is a delicate one and care is needed to avoid arbitrary or oppressive conclusions.”

Why so?  A contempt citation is a case where the one making the citation is the accuser, judge and executioner all in one.

To be sure also, the contempt power of the Senate and the House of Representatives, while constitutional, is not expressly provided in the Constitution. It is not written; it is only implied. It is not explicit; it is only implicit.

Congress derives this power from Article VI, Section 21 of the 1987 Constitution which states: “The Senate or the House of Representatives or any of its respective committees may conduct inquiries in aid of legislation by its duly published rules of procedure.”

It is held that to effectively conduct such inquiries, Congress must have the power to exact information from individuals “invited” or summoned to its committee hearings or sessions and where some are “uncooperative” or refuse to attend or answer questions, Congress may then cite them in contempt to compel their cooperation or testimony.

As our Supreme Court, in a 1950, ruling held: “The power of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation is broad. This is based on the proposition that a legislative body cannot legislate wisely or effectively without information respecting the conditions which the legislation is intended to affect or change.”

Still, the power is not without limits.

The first limit comes from the Constitution where the same Section that implies it mandates the conduct of any Congressional inquiry is subject to duly published rules of procedure and that “[t]he rights of persons appearing in, or affected by, such inquiries shall be respected.”

In several rulings, the SC set further limits.

In the celebrated NBN-ZTE scandal (Neri vs. Senate), the SC ruled that executive officials may not be compelled to answer questions covered by “privileged communication with the President.”  It also reiterated that the valid exercise of contempt power requires “respect for the rights of persons” appearing before congressional committees.

In Balag vs. Senate, the SC further imposed a limit on the length of time that Congress may detain a person for contempt.

Sometimes, we hear senators and representatives invoke the people’s “right to information of public interest” in compelling resource persons or witnesses to answer their questions. But the SC has also held that under the Bill of Rights, it is “subject to such limitations as may be provided by law.”  And there are numerous laws limiting this right.

The SC has also ruled that “the right of Congress or any of its committees to obtain information in aid of legislation cannot be equated with the people’s right to public information,” and Congress “cannot claim that every legislative inquiry is an exercise of the people’s right to information.”

The Court distinguished between the two rights because the people, in exercising their right to information, do not have the power to issue subpoenas nor to exact testimonies, unlike Congress.

Said the Court: “… while Congress is composed of representatives elected by the people, it does not follow, except in a highly qualified sense, that in every exercise of its power of inquiry, the people are exercising their right to information.”

I would surmise that contempt power can also be limited by “doctor-patient privilege,” although I have yet to see local jurisprudence on this.

These limits are as necessary as the power itself.  Because, as the SC held in Neri vs. Senate, “as evidenced by the American experience during the so-called ‘McCarthy era’ … the right of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation is, in theory, no less susceptible to abuse than executive or judicial power.”

Yet, when we watch the way Congress conducts hearings, its issuance of contempt orders one turn after another, and the way some members threaten resource persons or witnesses with contempt citations, we may not readily see abuse of power, but at the very least, trivialization of the power.

Sometimes, it even looks like the members of the House were acting with contempt when they cite in contempt certain persons appearing before them.

The most judicious limit to the exercise of contempt power by Congress is not the limit imposed by any Supreme Court ruling. It is the limit imposed by the members of Congress upon themselves derived from wisdom, statesmanship, and the correct and appropriate use of congressional powers.

Power used more often than necessary loses its value. True power is used sparingly and only when truly necessary.  If you have enormous power, the less you use it, the more valuable that power becomes, the more powerful you become.