‘…can we afford to be apathetic and ignore the presence of Han spies in Tarlac and other places in Apolinario Mabini’s archipelago?’
AFTER concluding that the “Pyrrhic victory of having executed the attack with surprise, cunning, and deceit belongs to the warlords of Japan whose dreams of conquest were buried in the ashes of Hiroshima and Nagasaki,” the Report Of The Joint Committee On The Investigation Of The Pearl Harbor Attack Of The Congress Of The United States Pursuant To S. Con. Res. 27, 79th Congress added “we seek to find lessons to avoid pitfalls in the future.” [https://www.senate.gov/about/resources/pdf/pearl-harbor-final-report-intro.pdf]
That Future has come and it is our Present. Shall we witness a 21st-century version of the sneak attack?
Why sneaky? “The December 7, 1941 attack on Pearl Harbor was an unprovoked act of aggression by the Empire of Japan. The treacherous attack was planned and launched while Japanese ambassadors, instructed with characteristic duplicity, were carrying out the pretense negotiations with the Government of the United States with a view to an amicable settlement of differences in the Pacific.” [Part V: Conclusions With Respect To Responsibilities]
And the homeland of Jose Rizal was involved regardless of the sentiments and wishes of the descendants of Andres Bonifacio.
“Within the same 24 hours, the Japanese also delivered attacks on the Philippines, Wake and Guam, as well as on Hong Kong and Malaya. The attack on Pearl Harbor cannot be disassociated from these. All were the reprehensible acts of a warrior nation, war-minded and geared to war through having been engaged in hostilities for the past four years, and long known to have aggressive designs for the dominance of the Far East.” [Report Of Navy Court Of Inquiry]
What did Intercepted Diplomatic Messages Sent By The Japanese Government Between July and December 8, 1941 reveal? Here is a sample: “Ships in port on the 29th. 1. Manila: Submarine tender Wotosu and Horan * Submarines 190 class 5, Submarines 170 class 5, Submarines 180 class 5 (When the 180 class entered port there were 8 but 3 departed, destination unknown.) Submarines 150 class 5 Submarines small size 4 Oilers, 2 (Pisu * and Trinity) Destroyers, 2 Gunboats, 1 (Beru *) 2. Cavite: Ton * Pasu * (being repaired). 3. It was announced on the 27th that for a time the lights at Sangley Point in Cavite, at Manila, Baguio, and on the buoys in the bay would be turned out.” [From_Manila (Nihro) To_Tokyo_No. 805]
Were these useful to American forces in Miguel Malvar’s native land?
“Various intercepts of Japanese diplomatic messages were received by the Army in the Philippines (Hq. USAFFE) before 7 December 1941. The decrypting, translating and processing of these messages were functions of the Navy. The Army monitored some circuits and turned the material over to the Navy for decrypting and translating. Under this system, the intercepted Japanese code messages were given to the Navy at Corregidor where the Navy had a ‘purple’ machine and other crypto-analytic facilities and personnel, not possessed by the Army, for decrypting and translating these messages. It was customary for the Navy, after these messages were decrypted and translated, to give the Army (Hq. USAFFE) such portion of the sum total of this intelligence, and the details and source thereof, as the Navy considered necessary to the functions of the Army. Those which were shown me before 7 December 194l were handed to me by Colonel Shearer, S. C., now deceased, who was the Army liaison with the Navy for that purpose. Certain of these messages concerned inquiries from Tokyo and replies by the Japanese Consul at Manila as to United States military and commercial ships in Manila Harbor. No record was made by the Army of the dissemination or substance of this intelligence, and the papers on which the intelligence was recorded have been destroyed.” [Affidavit Of Major General C. A. Willoughby. Investigation By Lt. Colonel, Henry C. Clausen, JAGD, For The Secretary Of War; Supplementary To Proceedings Of The Army Pearl Harbor Board]
“Among the messages picked up by the Signal Intelligence Service were reports by the Japanese Consul at Manila requesting the arrivals and departures of ships in Manila Harbor.” [Affidavit Of Lieutenant General Richard K. Sutherland. Investigation By Lt. Colonel, Henry C. Clausen, JAGD, For The Secretary Of War; Supplementary To Proceedings Of The Army Pearl Harbor Board]
“The Signal Intelligence Service, United States Army, operated an intercept station at Fort McKinley, immediately before 7 December 1941. Diplomatic messages in purple code, intercepted by this SIS were delivered to the Navy at Corregidor where they were decrypted and translated. Some or all of these messages, decrypted and translated were delivered to the SIS officer who delivered them to the Hq. USAFFE. The
decrypting and translating of these messages was a function of the Navy. The Army SIS monitored some circuits and turned the material over to the Navy for decryption and translation. The Navy had facilities and personnel, not possessed by the Army, for such processing of this intelligence. Whether all messages were transmitted by the Navy to the Army I do not know. All transmission of this subject material was entirely in the hands of the Navy. Dispatches from the War Department gave me ample and complete information and advice for the purpose of alerting the Army Command in the Philippines on a war basis, which was done prior to 7 December 1941.” [Affidavit Of General Of The Army Douglas Macarthur. Investigation By Lt. Colonel, Henry C. Clausen, JAGD, For The Secretary Of War; Supplementary To Proceedings Of The Army Pearl Harbor Board]
In our world of volatility, uncertainty, complexity, ambiguity, rapidity and radicality, we cannot be complacent. In our Brittle, Anxious, Nonlinear, and Incomprehensible world, can we afford to be apathetic and ignore the presence of Han spies in Tarlac and other places in Apolinario Mabini’s archipelago?
